On Some Unwarranted Tacit Assumptions in Cognitive Neuroscience† by Rainer Mausfeld
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 14 March 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00067
On some unwarranted tacit assumptions in cognitive
neuroscience†
Rainer Mausfeld*
Department of Psychology, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Psychologie, Kiel, Germany
Edited by:
Bernhard Hommel, Leiden University,
Netherlands
Reviewed by:
Lorenza S. Colzato, Leiden University,
Netherlands
Bernhard Hommel, Leiden University,
Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Rainer Mausfeld , Department of
Psychology, Christian-Albrechts-
Universität zu Kiel, Institut für
Psychologie, Kiel D-24098, Germany.
e-mail: mausfeld@psychologie.uni-
kiel.de
The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural
networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenom-
ena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is
ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physi-
cal principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such
conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper
argues that corresponding conceptions are rooted in four different aspects of our common-
sense conception of mental phenomena and their explanation, which are illegitimately
transferred to scientiﬁc enquiry.These four aspects pertain to the notion of explanation, to
conceptions about which mental phenomena are singled out for enquiry, to an inductivist
epistemology, and, in the wake of behavioristic conceptions, to a bias favoring investiga-
tions of input–output relations at the expense of enquiries into internal principles. To the
extent that the cognitive neurosciences methodologically adhere to these tacit assump-
tions, they are prone to turn into a largely a-theoretical and data-driven endeavor while at
the same time enhancing the prospects for receiving widespread public appreciation of
their empirical ﬁndings.
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The cognitive neurosciences originated about three decades ago,
instigated by the invention of new technologies for the study of
brain processes. Since their proclamation they have attained a tri-
umphal success, both in psychology and in the general public. The
sheer quantity of corresponding research alone bears witness to
this success. It is a reasonable guess to assume that presently more
scientists, in the broad spectrum of ﬁelds that goes under the label
of cognitive neurosciences, are studying the foundations of men-
tal phenomena than in the entire 2000 years before. Measured by
criteria such as the number of scientiﬁc disciplines involved and
of researchers participating, or the quantity of published papers,
or acquired grant money, the cognitive neurosciences undoubt-
edly are the most successful enterprise in the entire history of
psychology.
The cognitive neurosciences are a highly variegated interdis-
ciplinary ﬁeld involving a great range of disciplines, stretching
from genetics, biophysics, and neurophysiology to computational
approaches to psychological phenomena. Despite these differ-
ences, these ﬁelds share a deﬁning feature by which they regard
themselves speciﬁcally as cognitive neuroscience. This is the guid-
ing idea that reference to the behavior of neurons or populations
of neurons enters essentially into any explanatory account of psy-
chological phenomena and achievements. Accordingly, the cogni-
tive neurosciences focus on investigations of the potential neural
substrate of mental processes.
The corresponding experimental investigations have brought
forth a wealth of intriguing new ﬁndings concerning the relation
†This paper is partly based on Mausfeld (2010b).
of mental phenomena to neural processes and have advanced neu-
rophysiological understanding on all levels of analysis. The obser-
vations and ﬁndings that reveal systematic correlations between
certain kinds of mental phenomena and speciﬁc neural events
in the brain have found great resonance in the general public,
and have given rise to the expectation that a breakthrough in a
deeper understanding of mental phenomena is at hand. Accord-
ingly, the cognitive neurosciences are highly successful in attracting
public attention and became an immensely popular program-
matic research perspective. For a ﬁeld of foundational research,
this public resonance is quite remarkable and hardly a matter
of course. Rather, the history of science mostly testiﬁes to the
contrary (alchemy being an outstanding exception). The ques-
tion then arises as to the factors that made this unique public
success possible. The cognitive neurosciences are arousing a pub-
lic enthusiasm that could scarcely be the effect of achievements
pertaining to a deeper theoretical understanding. Advances in the-
oretical understanding tend to be tied, in the natural sciences, to
reformulations and radical re-conceptualizations of our ordinary
modes of thinking, and hence go along with an increasing ten-
sion to our common-sense intuitions. Thus, serious theoretical
advances will, as a rule of thumb, not elicit much enthusiasm
from the broader public. Of course, in the case of theoretically
mature disciplines, such a public success could result from devel-
opments that yield new technologies with a high impact on society,
or that challenge deep-seated philosophical world-views. But how
can a ﬁeld of foundational research that deals with phenomena
at the very boundary of theoretical understanding exert such an
overwhelming inﬂuence in almost all ﬁelds of psychology and
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receive such widespread and enthusiastic resonance in the media
and the general public?
The reasons can hardly lie in theoretical breakthroughs with
respect to our understanding of mental phenomena. By the stan-
dards of theoretical explanation that have been established in the
development of the natural sciences, our theoretical understand-
ing of even the simplest mental phenomena still barely scratches
the surface. Take for instance visual perception, arguably the old-
est and theoretically most mature ﬁeld of systematic psychology
enquiries. Nowhere in psychology should the prospect be better to
identify neural foundations of psychological phenomena. Indeed,
most standard text book chapters on visual perception convey
the impression that current neurophysiology offers explanations
for a variety of basic phenomena, and perceptual psychologists
are notoriously inclined to hastily call upon ad hoc pseudo-
explanations for isolated psychophysical phenomena in terms of
equally isolated neurophysiological ﬁndings. As a matter of fact,
however, such explanatory claims are unwarranted. The discrep-
ancy between the explanatory value of neural correlates and their
actual contribution to a better theoretical understanding of basic
internal principles underlying mental phenomena becomes all the
more discernible the better our theoretical understanding already
is. Color perception, which provides a comparatively rich body of
theoretical substratum, is an instructive case in point.With respect
to primary color coding, as captured by the Grassmann laws of
metameric color matches, the prospects for linking psychologi-
cal phenomena to neural events should be exceedingly promising.
Such an assessment,however, turns out to be utterly inappropriate.
For instance, McLeod observes that not even the most elemen-
tary properties such as trichomasy are presently understood in
their neural foundations and that even for elementary perceptual
relations “the signiﬁcance of neural events becomes increasingly
obscure.” (MacLeod, 2010, p. 172/173) With respect to a different
perceptual achievement, Zeki (1998) noted that the perception of
a “continuous line is a mystery that neurology has not yet solved.”
As to the claim that a theoretical understanding of visual percep-
tion derives from neurophysiological investigations, Barlow (1983,
p. 11) emphasized: “Nothing could be more misleading, for all the
important properties of the visual system were ﬁrst established by
psychophysical and psychological observations made on the sys-
tem working as a whole. [. . .] physiologists need to be told what
the visual system does before they can set about the difﬁcult task of
ﬁnding out how it does it.” Accordingly, advances in our psycho-
logical understanding of perceptual phenomena have in the ﬁrst
place beneﬁted and fostered neurophysiology rather the other way
round.
When we turn to most fundamental principles underlying per-
ception – such as the nature of “perceptual objects,” or, more
generally, the nature of data formats or conceptual forms on
which any kind of perceptual (and cognitive) information pro-
cessing by deﬁnition has to be based –, it becomes entirely opaque
how neurophysiological ﬁndings could contribute to a deeper
theoretical understanding of these foundational aspects. Among
many other deep theoretical challenges, perceptual psychology
still lacks an appropriate theoretical understanding of its core
notion, viz. that of a “perceptual object” (cf. Mausfeld, 2010a).
Corresponding theoretical challenges and problems have neither
been alleviated nor even been touched by empirical ﬁndings from
cognitive neuroscience.
Given the present state of our theoretical understanding of
mental phenomena and achievements, the overwhelming inﬂu-
ence of the cognitive neurosciences cannot be attributed to the-
oretical breakthroughs by which we have gained some deeper
understanding. All the more as such an understanding will most
likely lie on a level of abstraction that is far beyond our ordinary
modes of thinking and hence will not be well-suited to yield wide-
spread public resonance. In contrast, empirical ﬁndings of neural
correlates of psychological phenomena such as depression, coop-
erative behavior, empathy, political attitudes, or religious feelings
conform to core features of ordinary modes of thinking or can
be accommodated to them. Hence, they are suited to attract the
attention of the general public.
We therefore have to look for factors outside the realm of devel-
opments of explanatory theories in order to better understand
the dominance that the cognitive neurosciences currently exert
over almost all ﬁelds of psychology. This dominance is crucially
due, or so I will argue, to the impact of certain common-sense
conceptions1 on central but mostly tacit assumptions underlying
the cognitive neurosciences. The detrimental impact of common-
sense intuitions on the development of scientiﬁc theories has been
a matter of extensive enquiries in the history and philosophy of
science. With respect to the cognitive neurosciences, this impact
would merit closer scrutiny and deeper discussion. I will, how-
ever, conﬁne myself here to providing a few reminders of what is
or ought to be regarded as methodological truisms in the natural
sciences.
In order to prevent potentialmisunderstandings as tomy inten-
tions and the arguments adduced, I wish to emphasize a few points
from the outset. (i) My remarks will focus on speciﬁc issues that
arise in the context of efforts toward theoretical understanding
and explanation in psychology (understood as part of the natural
sciences). My concerns therefore relate primarily to those areas
of the cognitive neurosciences that deal with foundational aspects
of psychology and aim for a deeper theoretical understanding of
mental phenomena. Areas of the cognitive neurosciences that are
ﬁrst and foremost driven by neuroscientiﬁc purposes, or that focus
on animal studies are naturally less vulnerable to the adverse inﬂu-
ences of the kind of tacit common-sense intuitions addressed here.
Also, applied research in the cognitive neurosciences is not a tar-
get of my concerns here, because it follows its own proprietary
1I will understand, in the present context, the terms common-sense conceptions,
everyday conceptions, or ordinary modes of thinking in the broadest possible way,
namely as the diversity of modes by which we conceive of psychological phenomena
in all contexts other than that of the natural sciences. This usage comprises not only
those concepts and ways of world-making, which underlie, as part of our biological
endowment, our ordinary discourse about the world and our acts of perceiving,
but also derived concepts and notions that have been developed for other purposes
than those of the natural sciences, whether technological, philosophical, or of any
other kind. The distinctive feature of common-sense conceptions is their intuitive
plausibility, whereas conceptions in the natural sciences receive their value ﬁrst
and foremost from their explanatory power. Our common-sense categorizations
of phenomena and our common–sense conceptions of explanation are part of our
conceptual endowment (notwithstanding that they are multifariously molded by
cultural processes), and hence constitute themselves an important object of enquiry
of cognitive science.
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lines of thinking and employs criteria of success different from
the ones underlying foundational research. (ii) The problems and
issues to which I want to draw attention are well-know from the
history of the natural sciences and have been amply discussed
in great depth in the corresponding literature. They pertain to
core methodological aspects in the development of scientiﬁc the-
ories, and hence cannot be demoted to being merely philosophical
ones. Accordingly, I am solely interested here in some very gen-
eral methodological issues that are intrinsic to the development of
explanatory frameworks in the natural sciences. I have no interest
in issues that, in the context of scientiﬁc enquiries, could be dis-
carded as belonging to philosophy. (iii) These notes are not meant
to be an evaluation or a review of the present status of the cogni-
tive neurosciences; they merely have the goal of drawing attention
to some theoretical distortions of currently prevailing approaches.
Furthermore, they inevitably cannot do justice to the intricacies
and subtleties that are intrinsic to the issues addressed; rather I
have to conﬁne myself to a treatment on a level of abstraction on
which most of the claims made should be rather uncontroversial
in the context of the natural sciences. (iv) It is not my intention
to question in principle the integrative purposes of the cognitive
neuroscience. To repeat, the cognitive neurosciences have yielded
a wealth of intriguing new ﬁndings concerning the relation of
mental phenomena to neural processes and have advanced neuro-
physiological understanding on all levels of analysis. My intention
rather is to point out that currently prevailing approaches in
cognitive neuroscience are at risk to violate core methodologi-
cal principles of the natural sciences because they are based, in a
deleterious way, on tacit common-sense assumptions.
Before I address the tacit common-sense assumption involved,
I will start with some brief preparatory remarks on the constitutive
characteristics of the cognitive neurosciences, namely their focus
on the neural foundations of mental phenomena.
MENTAL PHENOMENA AND THE QUEST FOR THEIR
“MATERIAL” FOUNDATIONS
Mental phenomena are part of nature and hence belong to the
types of phenomena that we try to integrate, in natural science,
into a coherent theoretical framework. Attempts to theoretically
understand the nature of mental phenomena proceed on the
general assumption that mental phenomena are brought about
by speciﬁc properties of a biological system, namely the brain.
The corresponding premise has been regarded as a natural, basic
assumption of science since the 18th century at the latest (while
more recently – and astonishingly – it has been dubbed an “aston-
ishinghypothesis”). JosephPriestley clearly explicated this premise
when he stated that “the powers of sensation or perception, and
thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in con-
junction with a certain organized system of matter; and therefore,
that those powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a
system. This, at least, must be our conclusion till it can be shown
that these powers are incompatible with other known properties
of the same substance; and for this I see no sort of pretence.”
(Priestley, 1777, p. 26) The London Encyclopedia of 1829, subti-
tled Popular View of the Present State of Knowledge, annotated (p.
637): “Dr. Priestley apprehends that sensation and thought neces-
sarily result from the organization of the brain . . . but he professes
to have no idea at all of the manner in which the power of per-
ception results from organization and life.”2 Generally speaking,
this 200-year-old account from the Popular view of the Present
State of Knowledge very well describes our present-day theoretical
understanding of the relationships between perceptions, or other
mental activities, and features of the brain (despite the fact that
the sheer amount of isolated data might seduce us to come to a
more optimistic assessment).
For over 200 years, the premise that mental processes must be
considered a function of the brain has been more or less common-
place. This has deluded us into overlooking the fact that, despite
all the impressive insight we have gained into speciﬁc aspects, our
theoretical understanding is next to nil of what exactly – within
a speciﬁc range of mental phenomena and achievements – this
function might actually be taken to be3. Neither are we cur-
rently capable of giving an adequate theoretical account of the
fundamental mental processes in question, nor of producing a
theoretical conception answering the question on which physical
level of the brain’s structure we might ﬁnd the relevant principles
that explain mental phenomena. Take, for example, perception,
and how it is connected to functional organization of the brain:
From a psychological point of view, we are not even close to hav-
ing a theoretically adequate conception of perception; instead, we
are still trapped in (Aristotelian) picture and similarity concep-
tions of perception (despite the fact that their inadequacy has also
been obvious since the 17th century). From a biological point
of view, we do not know on which physical level of the brain’s
organization the relevant principles are to be located that gener-
ate from physico-geometrical inputs “objects of perception” – be
2Priestley did not know, as little as we do today, which physical principles form the
basis of speciﬁc mental processes, or how they do so (cf. Chomsky, 2010). Regardless
of how closely we might scrutinize the brain – be it through a microscope, modern
imaging devices, or future devices of yet greater precision –,wewill always encounter
physical objects and their given properties: neurons and synapses, neurotransmit-
ters, ions, electrons and protons. Leibniz’s mill-argument remains as valid as it was
in the 17th century. William James cited a remark made by the physicist Tyndall
in 1871, “in that lucky paragraph which has been quoted so often that every one
knows it by heart” (James, 1890/1983, p. 150): “Granted that a deﬁnite thought, and
a deﬁnite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do not possess the
intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable
us to pass by a process of reasoning from the one phenomenon to the other. They
appear together but we do not know why.”
3This is patently obvious when we look at achievements of relatively simple
organisms such as ants, bees, or the nematode C.elegans. The phenomenon of ant-
navigation, the waggle dance of the honeybee or the complex behavior of nematodes
have produced a large number of correlations between neuronal signals and behav-
ior – without even coming close to being able to actually provide explanations for
this behavior. In the case of C. elegans, the complete knowledge of the components
of its biological hardware would constitute a particularly favorable situation for
understanding its complex behavior (such as chemotaxis, thermotaxis and thermo
memory, or mechanosensory reactions). “C. elegans responds behaviorally to the
presence or absence of food in a plethora of ways. . . .Surprisingly little progress has
been made in understanding these responses” (Thomas and Lockery, 2000, p. 156).
This theoretical humbleness markedly contrasts with the kind of claims that pervade
cognitive neuroscience and which seem to presume that the theoretical challenge
is less serious when we are dealing with 100 billion neurons instead of 302. For
the favorable conditions of much simpler kinds of organisms, the programmatic
claim of the cognitive neurosciences that a theoretical understanding of behavioral
achievements crucially has to refer to the neural level apparently falls short of its
promise. A claim that is applicable to bees or nematodes but grossly founders, will
hardly look promising in the case of exceedingly more complex neural systems.
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it the levels of neurons or complex, dynamic systems of neurons,
sub-cellular structures – such as the interaction of proteins –, or
the level of quantum-theoretical processes etc4. To be sure, the
premise that psychological phenomena are achieved by a biolog-
ical organ, namely the brain, is a reasonable one, and unrivaled
within the context of the natural sciences. However, as long as our
relevant theoretical knowledge in psychology and biology contin-
ues to be poor, this premise remains rather inconsequential5. The
better our substantial theoretical understanding is, the better are
our chances to reﬁne our theories by biological insights and to
integrate them into an overarching theoretical perspective (e.g.,
Jenkins, 2000; Berwick and Chomsky, 2011).
Undeniably, during past decades we have gained a large amount
of detailed information on the correlations between mental phe-
nomena and neurobiological processes, such as the activation
of neurons or metabolic processes in certain areas of the brain.
But it would be a grave misunderstanding to mistake these ﬁnd-
ings for an explanation of psychological phenomena. In fact,
these ﬁndings even increase the explanatory gap, for now we do
not only have to explain the psychological phenomena as such,
but also why these phenomena relate to precisely this, that, or
some other neurobiological process. Most notably, we still lack
a satisfactory theory of the electro-physical activity of the brain.
Therefore, we presently cannot explain why the results from stud-
ies based on single cell recordings, local ﬁeld potentials, EEG,
fMRI, PET, etc., look the way they do, and not otherwise. As long
as we lack a deeper understanding of the physical mechanisms
underlying mental phenomena and achievements, the correlations
between these phenomena and neurobiological processes will be
of theoretical avail primarily to neurophysiology rather than to
psychology6.
4Whatever the character of the physical principles underlying mental achievements
turns out to be, it is to be expected that these principles are exceedinglymore abstract
and lie on a much deeper level of physical organization of the brain than a neural
one. Presently, there is not much that speaks in favor of the highly speculative claim
that the relevant physical principles underlying mental phenomena can be found
on the coarse physical level of neural organization.
5Gardner (1987, p. 286/287), in the early phase of the cognitive neurosciences,
reminded us once more of this matter of course: “One cannot have an adequate
theory about anything the brain does unless one also has an adequate theory about
the activity itself. It is not possible to study perception – even in its most ﬁne-grained
forms –without a theory of perception. . . . From this perspective, it is not possible to
enter into the nervous system as a disinterested observer who is simply chronicling
the facts as many neurosciences assume they are doing.”
6Even in neurophysiology, we do not understand, for example, which information is
coded by which principle in the sequence of action potentials (Rieke et al., 1997), or
which components of a living cell can performwhich kind of abstract computations.
Also, as Brezina (2010) noted, “the neuronal wiring diagram alone is not sufﬁcient
to specify, and permit us to understand, the computation that underlies behavior.” If
we look top-down from behavioral achievements to an allegedly underlying neural
base, we presently do not understand how the relevant computational operations
could be realized by the given biological substrate. As Gallistel remarked (1997, S.
77f.): „We clearly do not understand how the nervous system computes. We do not
know what are the foundations for its ability to compute. We do not understand
how it carries out the small set of arithmetic and logical operations that are funda-
mental to any computation, the operations that are part of the basic instruction set
in any computer ever developed, including massively parallel computers and neural
net computers. We do not, for example, understand how neurons multiply, add, and
compare the values of variables.” These deﬁcits are profound and cannot simply be
papered over by enthusiastic proclamations.
Hence, our primordial task in psychology (as well as in biol-
ogy) is to ﬁrst lay a suitable fundament for a serious theoretical
understanding by which we can then go beyond the centuries-
old scientiﬁc truism stating that psychological phenomena are
grounded in mechanisms of the brain (cf. e.g., Yolton, 1983) and
gain a deeper understanding of this relationship. Dogmatic pro-
nouncements about what is to be regarded as the “true” level of
explanation for psychological phenomena can hardly be expected
to foster our theoretical understanding. Moreover, such claims are
based on a profound misunderstanding about the methodological
principles of the natural sciences. Given that we presently know
next to nothing about the physical principles underlying mental
phenomena and achievements, there is no reason to assign the
level of neurons a privileged explanatory role7.
The 19th century was already marked by a tendency to reduce
fundamental theoretical questions of psychology to questions
about an alleged material substratum of mental phenomena. Cor-
responding ideas expressed a metaphysical worldview –“the phys-
ical is presumed to be epistemologically and metaphysically in
good order, and the mental is questionable” (Stoljar, 2006, p. 46) –
that, given the theoretical context of the time, was not completely
unreasonable. It was a result of the materialism which, in the 19th
century, was commonly accepted and regarded as an expression of
a general and uniﬁed natural science perspective. But Priestley was
already aware of the fact that the Newtonian concept of matter was
calling the classical mechanistic conception into question. A new
way of deﬁning the “physical” was undermining the foundation
of traditional ways of formulating the relation between material
substratum and mental capacities. This also meant that classical
materialism had been surpassed (Lange, 1902; Koyré, 1939/1978).
Physics had lost any intuitively comprehensible notions of matter.
Instead of matter, one now had to refer to the “physical,” that is,
the entirety of forces and entities that populate the currently best
explanatory accounts of physics. The concept of the “physical”
(cf. Stoljar, 2010), however, no longer lends itself to reduction-
ist approaches. Rather, in the history of physics, this concept has
proven itself to be open and constantly in ﬂux. It may comprise
entities such as gravitational ﬁelds, fermions, superstrings, or who
knows what else in the future. Hence, we presently still have an
insufﬁcient and continuously changing understanding of what
we regard as “physical.” And since we lack a clear-cut notion of
the “physical,” we lack a clear-cut notion of the “non-physical” as
well8. To put it brieﬂy: As opposed to what was the case in the 17th
century, a reductionist stance that assigns the level of neurons a
7Given the fact that our theoretical understanding in neurophysiology itself is sub-
ject to constant change, it would be hard to even formulate such a claim. To assign a
privileged role for the explanation of mental phenomena to a certain level of analy-
sis of current neurophysiology would make as much sense as it would have in the
19th century to claim that the physics of that time played a privileged role in the
explanation of chemical phenomena. To postulate, by contrast, that neurophysiol-
ogy will ultimately turn out to play a privileged role for the explanation of mental
phenomena would hardly provide interesting constraints for current attempts to
develop explanatory accounts in psychology, and hence not be of much relevance.
8Bertrand Russell and Noam Chomsky, in particular, have emphasized the inher-
ent openness of the concept of the physical. Because of this openness, attempts to
establish a physical foundation for mental concepts are pointless. In order to even
formulate them, “we have to have a notion of physical entity; we don’t. It is a mere
stipulation to include gravitational attraction, ﬁelds, Kekulé’s structural formulas,
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privileged role in the explanation of mental phenomena does no
longer testify to an uncompromising and thorough natural sci-
ence approach to mental phenomena. Rather, such reductionist
approaches seriously conﬂict with methodological principles that
have proven theoretically fruitful in the development of the natural
sciences9.
Accordingly, reductionist views that assign the level of neurons
a privileged role in the explanation of mental phenomena have
always remained a fringe position in the history of psychology.
But this changed with the rise of so-called cognitive neurosciences
in the 1980s. In the course of the proclamation of a new, interdis-
ciplinary scientiﬁc approach to mental phenomena a new attitude
has emerged that stipulates on which level of analysis, as of now,
mental phenomena have to be investigated. If mental phenomena
were investigated by studying neural processes, one would be able,
so the claim goes, to directly get to the explanatory roots of mental
phenomena, and hence to render an independent, psychological
level of analysismore or less obsolete. During the last decades, such
a conception has turned into a kind of widely accepted tacit back-
ground assumption whose appropriateness is regarded as a matter
of course. It has been accompanied by corresponding strands in
the philosophy of mind, where such conceptions also found their
most explicit expression. An instructive example for correspond-
ing claims is provided by Paul Churchland, a most prominent
proponent of a new “neurophilosophy:” “We are now in a posi-
tion to explain how our vivid sensory experience arises in the
sensory cortex of our brains: how the smell of baking bread, the
sound of an oboe, the taste of a peach, and the color of a sun-
rise are all embodied in a vast chorus of neural activity. . . . More
centrally, we can now understand how the infant brain slowly
develops a framework of concepts with which to comprehend the
world. And we can see how the matured brain deploys that frame-
work almost instantaneously: to recognize similarities, to grasp
analogies, and to anticipate both the immediate and the distant
future.” (Churchland, 1995, p. 3) Admittedly, Churchland’s stun-
ning claim is a particularly fatuous example of neuro-propaganda.
But it nevertheless is not untypical of the vigorous rhetoric that
has accompanied the cognitive neurosciences in the past two
decades10.
curved space-time, quarks, superstrings, etc., but not the processes, events, entities,
and so on postulated in the study of mental aspects of the world.” (Chomsky, 1996,
p. 44).
9Revealingly, the history of science shows that theoretical efforts in the natural sci-
ences have not primarily been concerned with issues of reduction to more basic
levels of analyzes. Rather, these efforts aim to develop abstract explanatory accounts
for certain types the phenomena and to achieve a uniﬁcation of principles on which
different types of theories are based (often allied with a structural conception of
explanation). Kitcher (1989, p. 448), for instance, spoke of an “outmoded concept
of reduction, which is tied to an inadequate account of scientiﬁc theories.”Accord-
ingly, radical reductionist perspectives are on the very fringes in the history of the
theoretical development of the natural sciences. Chemistry provides an instructive
example. Its success precisely rests on the fact that chemistry has abstained from
reductionist ties to the physics of that time (see e.g., Brock, 1992; Clericuzio, 2010).
10This rhetoric is reminiscent of the one that, in the 1960s, accompanied artiﬁcial
intelligence approaches to mental achievements, such as problem solving, pattern
recognition, or machine translation. For instance, Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963,
p. 205) annunciated that a rather simple program that answers questions, which
were formulated in a drastically restricted vocabulary and syntax, constituted an
“important initial step” toward the goal of “discovering the information processing
Psychology, understood as the endeavor to theoretically under-
stand mental phenomena and achievements, can naturally be
regarded as a branch of biology11. In biology, it is regarded as
a matter of course that relevant phenomena can and have to be
investigated on separate levels of analysis (cf. Tinbergen, 1963).
Psychology then constitutes an abstract level of analysis that is as
autonomous explanatorily as levels of analyzes that characterize
e.g., evolutionary theory, ethology, ecology, molecular biology, or
cell biology. Accordingly, psychology has many intriguing points
of contact to other ﬁelds of biology. In corresponding relation-
ships, psychology has been guided by its explanatory demands
rather thanbydogmatic principles. This changed in the 1980s,with
the proclamation of the cognitive neurosciences, when large areas
of psychology committed themselves again, in a historic regress,
to philosophy by adopting a metaphysical position that is scien-
tiﬁcally unmotivated and philosophically dubious, at best. This
metaphysical position, which assigns the level of neurons a privi-
leged role in the explanation of mental phenomena, is in conﬂict
with core methodological principles of the natural sciences, and as
a result has proven unfavorable for the development of adequate
explanatory frameworks for mental phenomena and achieve-
ments. In the course of these developments, the long-standing
and fruitful relationship of psychology with other ﬁelds of biology
has become burdened again by an element of dogmatism.
How could foundational research in psychology be dominated
for decades by such a dogmatic approach, and how can it continue
to be? The reasons for this development can hardly be expected to
lie in the dynamics of theory development. Rather, they must be
sought outside science itself, in factors pertaining to the psychol-
ogy of science or the sociology of science. The following sections
will brieﬂy address ﬁve of these aspects.
FIVE REASONS FOR THE CURRENT DOMINANCE OF
NEURO-ORIENTED CONCEPTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY
What is it that confers to neuro-oriented perspectives the kind of
attractiveness that they obviously currently have? The principle
reason can likely be found in the fact that such views blend in
well with some of our ordinary intuitions about psychological
phenomena and modes of explanation. The ideas that under-
lie the cognitive neurosciences receive their apparent plausibility
because they are basedon common-sense intuitions,which are tac-
itly transposed into a context that superﬁcially appears as natural
science.
structure underlying the act of ‘comprehending’ or the process of ‘understanding’.”
The literature of that time teems with excessive claims of this kind. Now that they
havedisappeared into thin air,we can clearly recognize their rhetoric character.How-
ever, as this kind of rhetoric fulﬁlls certain social functions in science, it is hardly
surprising that it perpetually reappears in different guises. It can ubiquitously be
detected in the cognitive neurosciences. By rhetorically extrapolating certain kinds
of isolated ﬁndings or local successes with respect to theoretical peripheral issues
to fundamental ones, the actual gap between what has been promised and what has
been achieved is concealed and attention is distracted from theoretical issues of real
intellectual signiﬁcance.
11This appraisal of psychology as a branch of natural science has been expressed by
Karl Bühler, amongmany others. Bühler emphasized, in hisDie Krise der Psychologie,
that “it must not be physics but rather biology which this research perspective has
to follow and toward which it has to be oriented.” (Bühler, 1927, p. 71)
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ONE: RELIANCE ON ORDINARY CONCEPTIONS OF
“EXPLANATION” (AT THE EXPENSE OF NATURAL SCIENCE
CONCEPTIONS OF EXPLANATORY DEPTH AND WIDTH)
In our ordinary modes of thinking we regard a phenomenon of
interest as explained when we manage to trace it to something
familiar and known. Our ordinary notions of explanation favor
explanations in terms of tangible and visible processes or things.
In other words, our ordinary modes of thinking exhibit a built-in
preference for concretistic explanations. Because of this, explana-
tions of mental phenomena (such as language,pattern recognition,
or depression) are considered intuitively more plausible when they
refer to concrete, “real” objects such as brain areas, neurotrans-
mitters or genes, rather than to abstract theoretical entities. The
inclination to uncritically take an investigation of the neural sub-
stratum of mental phenomena “as validation or invalidation of
our ordinary view of the world” is aptly called “neuro-realism”
by Racine et al., 2005, p. 160). The apparent plausibility of the
conceptions underlying the cognitive neurosciences derives from
our natural inclination to reduce the highly abstract and barely
comprehended principles underlying mental phenomena to their
alleged tangiblematerial substratum. Such an idea could have been
defended within the mechanistic worldview of the 17th century.
But after the classical conception of matter dissolved, we cannot
even formulate a corresponding conception in a coherent way.
Because we are in the grip of our ordinary conception of expla-
nation, we have severe difﬁculties to accept the fact that the notion
of explanation in the natural sciences radically deviates from the
one in everyday life. In the natural sciences,what is“real” is entirely
determined by what is postulated by our best theoretical accounts.
The entities to which we refer in corresponding explanations had
often previously been completely unknown (e.g., atoms, neutri-
nos, gravitational ﬁelds). Accordingly, in the natural sciences, we
explain something familiar, namely a phenomenon, by some-
thing previously unknown, namely abstract, theoretical entities
(cf. Koyré, 1939/1978, p. 155). Therefore, it is quite possible, and
in fact likely, that whatever we regard as a satisfactory explanation
for a given class of phenomena in the natural sciences, be it physics,
biology, or psychology, will not conform to the explanatory needs
of our ordinary modes of thinking. By the same token, explana-
tions that we ﬁnd satisfactory in our everyday modes of thinking
will, as a rule, be regarded as theoretically inadequate or irrelevant
in the natural sciences.
Prevalent notions of explanation and understanding employed
in the cognitive neurosciences differ markedly from the ones
underlying the natural sciences. This is instructively revealed by
an assessment by Gazzaniga (2006): “The single most important
insight that the cognitive neurosciences can offer ethicists is in
understanding how the brain forms beliefs. . . . Belief formation is
one of the most important areas in which cognitive neuroscience
needs to teach something to ethicists and to the world.” As we
presently have not even the glimmer of an idea of “how the brains
form beliefs,” the notion of understanding, on which Gazzaniga’s
assessment is based, obviously has no bearing with the notion of
theoretical understanding that is at the core of the natural sciences.
There is another characteristic difference between our ordinary
notion of explanation and the one underlying the natural sciences.
Our ordinary notion of explanation is a local one and aims to
relate a concrete phenomenon to a concrete cause. In contrast, the
history of science supports the view that “scientiﬁc explanations
do not confer intelligibility on individual phenomena by showing
them to be somehow natural, necessary, familiar, or inevitable”
Friedman (1974, p. 18). In the natural sciences, the concept of
explanation does not refer to isolated phenomena and their rela-
tions, but to properties of theories. The adequacy and value of
a theory manifests itself in its explanatory power. The distinc-
tive features of a successful theory pertaining to a certain range
of phenomena are its explanatory depth and explanatory width.
Explanatory depth refers to the property that the theory does not
remain at the surface level of common-sense notions, but features
a sufﬁciently deep deductive structure that connects it to experi-
mental consequences which, from an everyday point of view, one
would not necessarily have expected. Explanatory width refers to
the potential of a theory to subsume classes of phenomena under a
commonexplanatory framework that appear rather dissimilar und
unrelated from our everyday perspective12. The natural sciences
are willing to introduce and employ whatever kind of entities as
long as they strengthen the explanatory depth and width of a the-
ory. In this process, it is immaterial whether the entities to which
explanations refer are intuitively plausible and in accord with our
ordinary ideas on the corresponding set of phenomena.
In its preoccupation with local correlations between mental
phenomena, on the one hand, and processes that are concrete and
tangible from an everyday point of view, on the other, the notion
of explanation underlying the cognitive neurosciences is closely
related to our ordinary notions of explanation. It is this alliance
that conveys to the cognitive neurosciences their apparent plausi-
bility (as also witnessed by the widespread public interest in this
type of local, neural “explanations” for mental phenomena)13.
The wave of widespread fascination that accompanies brain
imaging studies can only be understood when we take the con-
cretistic inclinations of our ordinary modes of thinking into
account. The illusion of understanding, which these studies tend
to create (see Weisberg et al., 2008), stands in a stark contrast to
their actual explanatory avail, which often remains at the surface
of serious theoretical understanding. Using fMRI-studies on pain
as an example, Hardcastle and Stewart (2009) evaluate the actual
explanatory gain of such studies. They conclude that“most of these
studies are not telling scientists anything that they did not already
know from traditional psychological and clinical investigations.”
(p. 191) The outcome in theoretical understanding of the psycho-
logical phenomena under scrutiny provided by such studies does
not go beyond the psychological insights invested into the work:
“Thus far, it appears that the imaging technology has not improved
our theoretical understanding of cognition; it has merely given us
vivid illustrations of the cognitive processes that psychology had
already surmised were there.” (p. 192)
12Theories that exhibit no substantial deductive depth and explanatory width –
especially “local theories,” theoretically isolated models, or “theories” that crucially
rely on common-sense intuitions – could only be called theories in a degenerate
sense.
13An especially instructive example is the widespread public attention that mirror
neurons have received and the fanciful interpretations that have been sparked by the
corresponding ﬁndings (cf. Borg, 2007).
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TWO: A GENERAL FOCUS ON MENTAL PHENOMENA THAT
ARE SINGLED OUT BY EVERYDAY INTUITIONS (AT THE
EXPENSE OF THEORETICALLY RELEVANT PHENOMENA)
The cognitive neurosciences share another aspect with our
common-sense conception of mental phenomena and their expla-
nation, namely the selection of phenomena that are regarded as
being in particular need of explanation. In our ordinary mode
of thinking, those phenomena are taken to be in particular need
of explanation that cannot be taken for granted, and are unex-
pected and salient14. Conversely, we tend to take precisely those
mental aspects as a matter of course – and hence as not being
in need of explanation – that pertain to the most fundamental
principles of our mental make-up. In fact, it is a core feature of
our mental make-up that these aspects will pass unnoticed exactly
because of their foundational nature. Wittgenstein’s remark that
we are unable to notice what is always before our eyes also applies
to the scientiﬁc study of the mind15. Accordingly, when we are
searching for neural correlates by which we hope to gain a better
understanding of mental phenomena, we are inclined to take for
granted what actually is in need of an explanation and to focus on
phenomena that remain at the surface of our ordinary conception
of phenomena.
As is well know from the history of the natural sciences,
common-sense taxonomies are an inapt guide for the endeavor
of achieving, within the framework of the natural sciences, a the-
oretical understanding of the mind. In fact, already in the case of
physics, the tension between our ordinary intuitions, on the one
hand, and the methodological principles underlying the natural
sciences is so huge that its entire history can be understood as
an attempt to dispense with common-sense classiﬁcations of phe-
nomena and to instead follow lines of theorizing that are traced
out by the development of successful explanatory accounts. The
problems resulting from conﬂicts with common-sense intuitions
are hence the rule rather than the exception in natural sciences
that have not yet reached a mature state of theory development.
Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that when mental processes
become the object of scientiﬁc enquiry, our ordinary intuitions
14The reigning conceptions of perception, for example, accede to the ordinary clas-
siﬁcation of perceptual phenomena into “normal” and “illusory” ones, despite the
fact that the notion of “perceptual illusions” is based on a conﬂation and mix-up
of different architectural components (cf. Mausfeld, 2002). This confusion has been
pointed out again and again for more than 200 years and has been regarded as
a severe obstacle to the development of appropriate theory about the principles
underlying perception. Helmholtz (1855, p. 100), for instances, emphasized: “The
senses cannot deceive us, they work according to their established immutable laws
and cannot do otherwise. It is us who are mistaken in our apprehension of the
sensory perception.”
15An instructive example for a fundamental theoretical concept whose explana-
tory importance is almost entirely concealed from our ordinary intuitions about
perception is the concept of a “perceptual object.” Also, almost all structural and
architectural aspects of our mental architecture are invisible to us. An instructive
example for a core structural property of the perceptual system whose consequences
pervade all of our mental activity is our capacity for maintaining different – and
sometimes even conﬂicting – mental perspective simultaneously with respect to
the same input situation. This capacity for “multiperspectivity” must be grounded
in speciﬁc architectural and computational properties of the perceptual systems
and subsequent systems. Despite the fact that these corresponding phenomena and
achievements point to a core feature of our mental make-up, they have received little
attention in the psychology of perception and in cognitive science (Mausfeld, 2011).
will, as a rule, be an even stronger impediment for the development
of explanatory theories.
The characteristic gap between our ordinary intuitions and
the kind of ideas that prove to be fruitful for the cumulative
development of explanatory theories confronts us with partic-
ular difﬁculties in psychology. For the types of classiﬁcation of
phenomena that promise to yield, by appropriate theoretical ide-
alizations, explanatorily fruitful theories about some abstract prin-
ciples underlying our mental achievements may appear rather
unnatural from our everyday perspective. Conversely, ordinary
categorizations of mental phenomena will quite likely turn out
to be inadequate and infertile for the development of explanato-
rily successful theories about relevant underlying principles, and
hence cannot be expected to survive enquire. It would therefore
hardly be surprising if almost all truly interesting psychological
phenomena of our ordinary life remained untouched by a nat-
ural science approach and the kind theoretical insights it could
yield into the nature of the mind – a point clearly recognized and
expressed by Helmholtz (1862/1896), and Chomsky (e.g. 1988 p.
158f; 2000, p. 22f).
The overwhelming impact of our ordinary conceptions about
mental activity manifests itself in the cognitive neurosciences
already in the selection of phenomena that are singled out as
particularly amendable for an “explanation” in terms of neural
processes. Notwithstanding the usage of most recent techno-
logical advances, the general approach of the cognitive neuro-
sciences resembles more that of a naturalist than a natural science
approach. Concordant with a naturalist’s attitude, the cognitive
neurosciences seem to be more dedicated to ﬁnding and describ-
ing the peculiarities and particularities of the relation of ordinary
psychological phenomena to neural ones than to gaining a deeper
theoretical understanding of general principles. The inﬂuence of
common-sense intuitions is sometimes masked or buried by the
technical language employed – e.g., in ﬁelds such as “attention,”
“perception” or “thinking” – and hence hard to identify. Mostly,
however, the impact of common-sense conceptions is rather obvi-
ous. This is especially truewith respect to studies that have received
widespread public attention – e.g., the question whether “trust” is
modulated by oxytocin or testosterone, whether a person’s “will-
ingness to cooperate” may be manipulated by transcranial mag-
netic stimulation, or when neural correlates of feelings of “roman-
tic love” were searched for in the caudate nucleus. Such investi-
gations, notwithstanding their potential relevance for neurophys-
iology, suggest that already by linking psychological phenomena
to neural processes a deeper theoretical understanding had been
gained of the psychological phenomena in question. In fact, how-
ever, such studies usually take their starting point in everyday phe-
nomena and remain at the surface of these ordinary conceptions
in their conclusions. Research perspectives that focus on neural
correlates tend to underestimate or overlook the deep theoretical
challengewithwhich attempts are confronted to better understand
the abstract psychological principles on which the corresponding
phenomena and achievements are based. Neuro-oriented perspec-
tives rather dodge these theoretical problems by purporting that
they deal with the “true” basis of mental phenomena, and that
a focus on neural correlates could therefore serve as a kind of
explanatory shortcut. Corresponding approaches can hardly be
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expected to yield a serious cumulative theoretical understanding,
because their psychological explanatory gain remains mostly at
the surface of our ordinary conceptualizations. All the same, they
currently thrive because the alliance of neurophysiological per-
spectives with common-sense modes of thinking greatly attracts
public attention and boosts the public visibility of psychology.
Conversely, it is hardly surprising in face of the history of the
natural sciences, that an approach that focuses on a deeper theoret-
ical understanding of single isolated (and idealized)“instruments”
from the entire orchestra of our mental abilities radically conﬂicts
with our ordinary intuitions and hence will hardly elicit wide-
spread public attention. The kind of phenomena that we regard
as particularly interesting from our ordinary perspective almost
always pertains to achievements brought forth by interactions of a
great many of these instruments. We therefore regard, in our ordi-
nary modes of thinking, the person as a whole as a natural unit
of analysis rather than isolated and idealized subsystems of the
mind/brain. Accordingly, enquiries that focus on single speciﬁc
subsystems that are amendable to theoretical idealizations must
inevitably appear misguided and absurd. In contrast, theoretical
notions that exhibit a close tie to our ordinary conceptions obvi-
ously receive a higher degree of plausibility and hence can be more
easily communicated to a wider public.
The inclination to adhere to common-sense classiﬁcations of
phenomena also is sustained by current science policies, which
exhibit a strong tendency to favor interdisciplinary research
projects. Of course, interdisciplinary projects can be advanta-
geous in technologically oriented ﬁelds. In areas of foundational
research, however, attempts to accelerate scientiﬁc progress by
organizational policies that enforce or reward interdisciplinary
work are likely to be pernicious, because interdisciplinary research
perspectives increase the predisposition to remain, as a common
theoretical denominator, close to the surface of common-sense
intuitions. Hence, science policies that favor interdisciplinarity in
fact tend to be an impediment to the advance of serious theoreti-
cal understanding – a clear lesson from the history of sciences that
have achieved substantial theoretical content.
The closer a phenomenon remains to the surface of our every-
day conceptualization, the easier it is to discover neural corre-
lates and manipulate these correlations. These correlates – and
the ability to systematically manipulate psychological phenom-
ena – convey to us the impression that we have achieved a better
understanding of the phenomena in questions. In line with our
ordinary modes of thinking, we do not take these correlations as
ﬁndings that themselves are in need of explanation but rather are
inclined to regard them as explanations of the phenomena in ques-
tion. However, the ability to successfully predict and manipulate a
class of phenomena is, as the history of sciences amply illustrates,
for deeper principle reasons entirely independent of their theo-
retical understanding (notwithstanding the fact that both aspects
are usually correlated in mature sciences)16. With respect to our
16In psychology as well, applied areas and foundational enquiries follow indepen-
dent paths of development. The institutional organization of a discipline must
therefore take this difference – which is a categorical, not merely a gradual differ-
ence – into account. In his work on the history of science, Kuhn pointed out that
almost no historical society has managed successfully to simultaneously advance
ordinary classiﬁcations of mental phenomena, one can, of course,
identify a broad range of condition and effect variables – especially
at the architectural periphery of performance aspects – and some-
times even be able to systematically manipulate these phenomena
(which may be very useful for pragmatic purposes). If the phe-
nomenon under scrutiny is appropriately chosen, a closer analysis
of these condition and effect variables may in fact signiﬁcantly
contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding. But studies of
this kind can in noway serve as a kind of surrogate for independent
theoretical enquiries.
The inclination to draw on ordinary taxonomies of phenom-
ena and to single out mental phenomena by everyday intuitions
rather than by theoretical considerations brings forth especially
detrimental effects on theoretical progress in foundational psy-
chological research. Areas of the cognitive neurosciences that
primarily pursue neurophysiological goals, or are based on animal
studies are naturally much less prone to fall prey to correspond-
ing psychological common-sense intuitions. In fact, ethological
modes of thinking can provide an effective antidote against the
inﬂuence of some types of unwarranted common-sense intuitions
in foundational psychological research.
There are other types of tacit common-sense intuitions that can,
in the context of the natural sciences, exert a detrimental inﬂuence
on thedevelopmentof theoretical understanding,viz. ones relating
to methodological conceptions of how theoretical knowledge can
be achieved. Whereas the deleterious inﬂuences discussed so far
are speciﬁc to the domain of foundational psychological research,
the adverse inﬂuence of common-sense intuitions pertaining to
research methodology can affect all areas of the cognitive neuro-
sciences (as well as other domains of the natural sciences). The
next two sections deal with two types of common-sense intuitions
that are related to methodological issues.
THREE: INDUCTIVIST (MIS-)CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS
It is well-known from the history of the natural sciences that
there are persistent and deep-rooted common-sense intuitions
technology and science. Ancient Greece, for example, favored science, epistêmê, over
technology, technê, which was regarded as a ﬁnished heritage. Rome, in contrast,
became famous for its technological achievements, but produced no notable sci-
ence. “Germany during the century before World War II is the only nation that has
managed simultaneously to support ﬁrst-rate traditions in both science and technol-
ogy. Institutional separation – the universities for Wissenschaft and the Technische
Hochschulen for industry and crafts – is a likely cause of that unique success. As
a ﬁrst approximation, the historian of socioeconomic development would do well
to treat science and technology as radically distinct enterprises, not unlike sciences
and the arts.” (Kuhn, 1971, p. 285) The widespread and persistent idea that sci-
ence and technology developed hand in hand, and that science emerged as a kind
of abstract continuation of technology is based on a profoundly distorted pic-
ture of their actual historical developments (see inter alia Koyré, 1956; Westfall,
1983; Gaukroger, 2006). The deepest distinguishing mark is the different relation
to common-sense conceptions. While technology is predominantly motivated by
common-sense conceptions and develops, conceptually and methodologically, in
line with them, the major developments in science have been achieved by radically
dispensing with common-sense intuitions. Science and technology developed, up
to the 19th century, within independent conceptual frameworks, pursued different
goals and were guided by different methodological principles. In terms of cogni-
tive science, it seems reasonable to conjecture that science and technology exploit
different mental capacities.
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that inﬂuence in a deleterious way conceptions of how theo-
retical progress can be achieved. In our everyday conceptions,
we think of knowledge as cumulating through the gathering of
facts. The cognitive neurosciences seem to favor a correspond-
ing inductivist conception of theory development, according to
which explanatorily successful theories are almost automatically
brought forth by a pertinacious accumulation of empirical ﬁnd-
ings, without the need for independent theoretical efforts. The
sheer quantity of isolated data and experimental ﬁndings on the
“neural foundations” of mental phenomena has conveyed an illu-
sion of deeper understanding and has fostered the expectation
that experimental investigations of a broad spectrum of neural
variables will by themselves eventually yield a deeper theoretical
understanding of the principles underlying mental phenomena
and achievements. The corresponding a-theoretical and extremely
inductivist conception characterizes large areas of the cognitive
neurosciences. To mention just one example, such a conception
seems to be explicitly endorsed by Yarkoni et al. (2010), who
programmatically regarded it as the essential basis for “a cumu-
lative science of human brain function.” On their view, cumu-
lative progress in the cognitive neurosciences has to be based
“on accumulated evidence from hundreds or thousands of indi-
vidual experiments” and therefore can only be ensured by “the
synthesis and modeling of existing data, in addition to the collec-
tion of new data.” The modern variants of Baconian inductivism
have bred what Brenner (1997, p. 37), with respect to biology,
called “the orgy of fact extraction in which everybody is currently
engaged.”
It is well known that corresponding inductivist conceptions of
theory development profoundly misrepresent actual theory devel-
opment in the history of the natural sciences. The quintessence
of the insights into the character of modern (i.e., post-Galilean)
science that have been achieved by corresponding enquires has
been succinctly expressed by Koyré (1968, p. 18): “. . . science
is primarily theory and not the gathering of ‘facts’.” The suc-
cess of the natural sciences depends, more than on anything
else, on achievements that pertain to explanatorily successful
re-conceptualizations of previous modes of thinking. These re-
conceptualizations in the theoretical frameworks employed for
singling out relevant phenomena and for formulating theoreti-
cal principles cannot be derived from whatsoever type of “facts.”
Furthermore, and more importantly, inductivist conceptions of
theory development are deeply ﬂawed for reasons of principle.
Because of this, the widespread idea is misguided that by “simply
chronicling the facts” a theoretical understanding of mental phe-
nomena could be attained, “as many neurosciences assume they
are doing” (Gardner, 1987, p. 287).
Nevertheless, inductivist conceptions are a core element of the
research methodology that tacitly governs large areas of the cog-
nitive neurosciences and has turned the ﬁeld into an extremely
data-driven enterprise. Inductivist conceptions, furthermore, have
given rise to a degenerate and “localist” notion of theory and
have made experiments on isolated local issues almost an end
in itself. As a result, the gap has widened between the abundance
of isolated ﬁndings in well-established experimental paradigms,
on the one hand, and the prospects for an explanatorily fruit-
ful theoretical integration of these ﬁndings, on the other. Wide
areas of the cognitive neurosciences exhibit a disdain for theo-
retical enquiries that is unprecedented in the entire early history
of cognitive science, ranging from Alhazen to Helmholtz. A-
theoretical and inductivist attitudes unavoidably go along with
a negligence of long-term investments into cumulative theory-
building. As a result, they rob and deplete, in the long run,
the theoretical accomplishments that have been achieved by ear-
lier generations. Also, a discipline that exhibits a disregard for
independent theoretical efforts becomes susceptible to a substi-
tutive form of theory development in which theoretical vogues
follow another without any substantial cumulative theoretical
progress.
FOUR: TAKING INVESTIGATIONS OF INDEPENDENT AND
DEPEND VARIABLES AS AN END IN ITSELF
Fields that are marked by an inductivist orientation and accord-
ingly attach little value to independent theoretical enquiries char-
acteristically exhibit an overemphasis on investigations of “inde-
pendent” and “dependent” variables which they almost regard as
an end in itself. Again, this tendency is fostered and supported by
our ordinary intuitions about mental processes. In our ordinary
modes of thinking, we are mainly interested in the variables by
whichmental phenomena can be affected ormanipulated (“Which
factors bring forth a phenomenon or have an effect upon it?”)
and the corresponding effect variables (“What kind of observable
effects are brought forth by different factors?”). In contrast, the
internal principles and processes that are causally responsible for
the kind of observed dependencies usually do not ﬁgure in our
ordinary accounts.
Since these internal principles and mechanisms are practically
invisible in our experience, we tend to focus on input vari-
ables, i.e., variables by which a phenomenon can be brought
forth or modulated, and on output variables, i.e., variables that
reﬂect the effects of the variations of the input variables on
a phenomenon in question. At the same time, we ignore or
gravely underestimate the complexity of the relevant underly-
ing internal principles. This propensity is itself the result of our
mental make-up (and hence a due research target for cognitive
science). However, if this propensity is made into a method-
ological guideline for research, as in behaviorist paradigms, it
clashes with basic methodological principles that have proven
fruitful in the history of the natural sciences, and becomes per-
nicious to theory development. Still, due to the deeply entrenched
impact of our ordinary modes of thinking, approaches that
take investigations of independent and dependent variables (or
input and output variables) as an end in itself pervade, often
in a concealed way, large areas of psychology and cognitive
science.
Corresponding perspectives are a heritage of behaviorism and
have survived because they conform to our ordinary modes of
thinking. Actually, the most crucial aspects of what has been
referred to as the cognitive revolution have left no traces in the
cognitive neurosciences. The so-called cognitive turn was, con-
trary to the intentions of its most prominent protagonists, more a
change in terminology than a theoretical paradigm-shift. Behav-
iorist convictions have survived under the surface of new jargon.
Two decades after the cognitive turn began,Miller (1979) observed:
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“What seems to have happened is thatmany experimental psychol-
ogists who were studying human learning, perception, or thinking
began to call themselves cognitive psychologists without changing
in any obvious way what they had always been thinking and –
as if they suddenly discovered they had been speaking cognitive
psychology all their lives. So our victorymay have beenmoremod-
est than the written record would have led you to believe.” What
Miller regarded as a deplorable situation is proclaimed as a virtue
by Roediger (2004), who hailed the fact that “behaviorism is alive
and well and nothing ‘has happened’ to it. . . . Behaviorism is alive
and most of us are behaviorists.” Roediger’s assessment certainly
applies to cognitive neuroscience as well. Even if most cogni-
tive neuroscientists might remain aloof to explicit endorsements
of behaviorism, the shared methodological and meta-theoretical
presumptions can be easily identiﬁed. While the idea of classical
behaviorism that statements about mental states can be reduced
to statements about behavior will hardly have any adherents any-
more, cognitive neuroscientists nevertheless are prone to accept
the idea that reference to behavior enters essentially into any ade-
quate theoretical account of mental phenomena and achievements
(cf. Strawson, 1994, p. 31ff). Fodor (2003) is thus right in stating:
“In fact, though, practically all experimental psychologists and
philosophers of mind continue to be behaviorists of one kind or
other. They have just ceased to notice that they are.” The dis-
dain for independent theoretical enquiries and the preoccupation
with investigating and modeling of input–output relations is a
characteristic mark of the inﬂuence of both behavioristic think-
ing and common-sense conceptions of mental phenomena. The
cognitive neurosciences have inherited from behaviorism what
Mandler (Baars, 1986, p. 255) described as “fear of theory” and
as an “antitheoretical point of view” that “characterized American
Psychology and American science through the 19th century and
into the 20th century.”
The objection that in the natural sciences, be it physics, biology
or psychology, input and output variables are the only empirically
determinable and measurable data, is obviously true but pointless.
Nothing follows from this fact that would allocate independent
theoretical efforts a subordinate role. Measurement variables are
an indispensable element of theory development but neither an
end in itself nor the subject matter of theories. Just as physical the-
ory does not aim at modeling measurement variables but rather
at a theoretical understanding of a range of signiﬁcant physical
phenomena, psychology also aims at a theoretical understand-
ing of speciﬁc classes of mental phenomena. The same is true of
biology, where it would absurd to dodge the task of developing
appropriate theories about the achievements of speciﬁc biolog-
ical systems – be it bird vocalization, navigation of desert ants,
or echolocation of bats – by an analysis of condition and effect
variables. It is a profound misconception of the methodologi-
cal principles of the natural sciences to favor investigations of
input–output relations at the expense of theoretical enquiries.
For instance, in solar astrophysics, it would be non-sensical to
restrict enquiries to observational data, such as protuberances and
electromagnetic energy emitted from the solar periphery. Rather,
enquiries aim at a theoretical understanding of thermonuclear
processes that are happening in the interior of the sun. Observ-
able data are not an end in itself but an important ingredient for
achieving a theoretical understanding of the corresponding phe-
nomena. The same holds true for enquiries into the principles
underlying mental phenomena and achievements (cf. Chomsky,
1980, p. 189). Behavior only provides a type of data and cannot be
assigned a privileged status or an epistemological priority to other
kinds of data17.
Nevertheless, in the history of psychology, the analysis of input-
and output-variables has always received more attention than
work on the theoretical conceptualization of relevant internal
principles18. This imbalance may be viewed as a kind of compen-
satory effort aiming to divert attention from theoretical incertitude
and precariousness to the supposedly solid ground of method-
ologically highly sophisticated analyzes of condition and effect
variables. While, for instance, perceptual psychology offers a rich
variety of detailled research on the nature of stimulus condi-
tions (including important mathematical analyzes in ecological
physics), efforts to gain a theoretical understanding of internal
principles are rather feeble, if not disdained. Needless to say, inves-
tigations of relevant stimulus conditions are an essential element
in the process of developing appropriate theoretical accounts of
internal principles. However, they cannot be used as a surrogate
for independent theoretical efforts. Yet, there is a strong tendency
in perceptual psychology to trivialize the problem of the internal
principles by misconstruing internal structure as a kind of mirror-
image of external world properties (in line with the naïve realism
of our ordinary conception of perception). Because of this ten-
dency, the deepest and most important insights into fundamental
principles of perception, as expressed in the notion of “Gestalt” or
in Helmholtz’s sign conception of perception, remain theoretically
unredeemed, and detached.
While investigations of the relation between input and out-
put variables are an indispensable tool for developing successful
explanatory theories, they are a methodological surface charac-
teristics rather than a constitutive feature of a natural science
approach. This to some extent also holds true for methodolog-
ical features such as quantiﬁcation or experimentation. Despite
widespread misconceptions in this respect, a scientiﬁc approach
does not become a natural science approach merely because it
relies on these methods. A mimicking of surface characteristics of
17In fact, the integration of our cognitive functions into a behavioral expression, i.e.,
our actions, will probably be for principled reasons not amendable to the method-
ological principles of the natural sciences. In contrast to simpler organisms, whose
behavior is bound by the effects of environmental stimulus variables, human behav-
ior is brought forth by the entire orchestra of mental faculties, including those that
exhibit features of spontaneity and creativity. This makes the prospects daunting
if not hopeless to identify abstract explanatory principles of how input conditions,
given an internal state, yield behavior. Accordingly, within the framework of the
natural sciences, human behavior might remain an epistemological mystery. In
contrast, theoretical enquiries into the nature of our conceptual endowment appear
to be amendable to the kind of idealizations and abstractions that characterize
the methodological principles underlying the explanatory success of the natural
sciences.
18For similar reasons, aspects pertaining to statistical methods for evaluating evi-
dence characteristically have received far more attention in psychology than aspects
pertaining to the development of explanatorily successful re-conceptualizations. As
Suppes (1962, p. 260) correctly noted: „It is a paradox of scientiﬁc method that the
branches of empirical science that have the least theoretical developments often have
the most sophisticated methods of evaluating evidence.”
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the natural sciences in the context of common-sense classiﬁcations
of phenomena will inevitably bring about a cargo-cult science.
The tendency to illegitimately transfer to a science context tacit
common-sense assumptions about the acquisition of theoretical
knowledge is, needless to say, not a distinctive mark of the cogni-
tive neurosciences but can be recognized in all ﬁelds of the natural
sciences. Likewise, the problems that originate from the result-
ing a-theoretical attitudes have gained inﬂuence in all domains in
the wake of the current academic Zeitgeist. However, the cognitive
neurosciences, and psychology in general, are particularly in jeop-
ardy because the detrimental effects of corresponding attitudes on
theory development are much severer in sciences that have not yet
reached a mature state of theory development.
FIVE: “SIMPLE” AND “OBJECTIVE” ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (ABETTING THE
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF INPUT–OUTPUT VARIABLES TO
THE DISADVANTAGE OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO CUMULATIVE
THEORY DEVELOPMENT)
In face of the plenitude and depth of theoretical insights and intu-
itions that have been achieved in the intellectual history of psychol-
ogy, the currently predominant disdain for theoretical efforts is
quite startling. The methodological strictures that pervade current
cognitive neuroscience have yielded a degeneration of theoretical
discourse that arguably is unprecedented in the ﬁeld, maybe with
the exception of the era of behaviorism. Psychological factors per-
taining to the inﬂuence of common-sense conceptions will hardly
sufﬁce to explain this development. Rather, in the natural sciences,
a large-scale disregard for theoretical efforts can only occur under
favorable sociological conditions regarding the organization of
science.
In past decades, the higher education sector has become
increasingly been exposed to market forces and corporate orga-
nizational thinking, a process that is expedited by a burgeoning
for-proﬁt university industry. In the course of these developments,
the mechanisms regulating individual academic careers have also
been more and more subjected to criteria derived from econom-
ics19. Before these developments, the chief regulating value for
academic careers had been “reputation.” This value eludes a sim-
ple deﬁnition and hence cannot be captured by a set of simple
indices. It presupposes an established and well-functioning sys-
tem of intellectual values and standards and can only serve the
19The current dominance of the cognitive neurosciences cannot be understood
without taking into account the predominant cultural and social values and the
social context, in which these ideas have emerged. Mandler’s (2007) observations,
concerning the emergence of behaviorism, apply mutatis mutandis to cognitive
neuroscience: “In science and philosophy, the period was marked by a pragmatic,
atheoretical preoccupation with making things work – a trend to ﬁnd its expression
in psychology in functionalism and behaviorism. . . [Behaviorism] was consistent
with a number of old and newAmerican cultural and social value. It also had its kin-
dred movements in such developments as the drive for scientiﬁc management and
the time-and-motion studies of Frederick W. Taylor designed to make the Ameri-
can workers more productive at less cost.” (Mandler, 2007, p. 49/111) As to other
political factors, beyond economistic modes of thinking, that are currently shaping
the development of the cognitive neurosciences, see for example the corresponding
reports of the National Research Council (NRC) (2008, 2009)) and of the Royal
Society (Flower, 2012)
function it is supposed to fulﬁll as long as the system of intellec-
tual values is intact. The more established academic value systems
erode, the stronger becomes the need to ﬁnd a kind of simple and
objective surrogate for “reputation.” Economic modes of thinking
promote the acceptance of superﬁcially rational indices by which
“reputation” as a regulating value can be superseded. The guiding
idea in this process is that the actual yield of research investments
manifests itself in an objective and straightforwardway in a kind of
symbolical capital, as expressed by indicators such as publication
and citation indices, or other measures of “visibility.” This type of
symbolical capital again serves to accumulate furthermaterial cap-
ital, i.e., funding for people and apparatus, etc., which, in turn, is
used to foster and advance the further accumulation of symbolical
capital.
Accordingly, “external success” as indicated by “objective” soci-
ological variables is presumed to mirror to some relevant extent
“internal success,” i.e., achievements that contribute to long-term
theoretical progress. Such a presumption may be granted, under
favorable circumstances, some validity in a mature science, i.e., a
natural science that has dispensed with common-sense notions of
phenomena and explanation. However, in light of the history of
science, such a presumption is hardly warrantable in sciences such
as psychology or cognitive neuroscience that are still in their earlier
stages of theoretical development. In these sciences, institutional
reliance on speciously “objective” variables of “external success”
as key evaluation or control variables will inevitably incite the
temptations of individual scientists to surreptitiously increase the
values of their corresponding indices by suitable strategies. Iron-
ically, these indices establish a kind of “egalitarian” element into
academic careers, because they allow nearly anybody of enough
determination to produce favorable indicator values in a virtu-
ally algorithmic fashion. Hence, it is hardly surprising that in the
individual planning of academic careers, publication strategies are
absorbing a rapidly growing share of productive energy.
The more “straightforward” and “objective” key control vari-
ables for academic careers are, the more vulnerable they become
to individual attempts to optimize them in a direct way. Hence,
these control variables become more and more useless as indica-
tors of scientiﬁc achievements20. These dynamic effects, which are
an inescapable and pernicious consequence of the current trend
toward subjecting foundational research to economic criteria and
imposing control and evaluation parameters that are alien to nat-
ural science, are conspicuous and well-known. Still, the currently
predominant institutional organization of science proceeds on the
presumption that the apparent face validity of such control vari-
ables and their acceptance by the general public outweigh their
adverse consequences. It thereby dodges the demanding task of
establishing regulation variables that are based on a fertile bal-
ance between criteria for “internal success” in terms of long-term
20It is quite surprising that a discipline which rightfully prides itself of its high
methodological standards has become addicted to the idea that a vital aspect of
its internal organization almost exclusively can be based on indices whose validity
and whose vulnerability to a direct surreptitious optimization have, up to now, not
been systematically studied. The widespread acceptance of such indices derives from
little more than their apparent plausibility with respect to our everyday conception
of science – a criterion which we would hardly accept in situations of far lesser
importance.
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theoretical progress, and “external success” in terms of short-term
sociological variables. As the institutional reliance on short-term
indicators of “external success” continues to increase, a gap begins
to open between the “yield” as expressed by these indicators, and
actual scientiﬁc achievements in terms of theoretical progress.
This is a process which, in the long run, will erode the individual
and societal willingness to make long-term investments in theory
development, on which the natural sciences vitally depend, and
thus lead to a depletion of the theoretical substratum that has
been achieved by previous generations.
On an individual level, the currently effective academic con-
trol and evaluation parameters have fuelled tendencies to focus
on problems which will quickly and predictably transform into
publishable results. Patently, the safest way to swiftly ensure auspi-
cious values on relevant evaluation parameters is a trouble-free
production, in an assembly line manner, of more or less the-
oretically triﬂing or isolated experimental results. This state of
affairs has in turn affected and shaped the mode of operation in
research routine. The cognitive neurosciences appear to be par-
ticularly vulnerable to such deleterious developments. Once one
has mastered apparatus and jargon of the neurosciences, one can
deal with the entire spectrum of mental phenomena that fasci-
nate us in our ordinary life, ranging from perception, thinking,
or decision-making to depression, cooperative behavior, political
attitudes, advertising, or religion. The procedural schema of cor-
responding neuro-oriented research does rarely require to work
onesway into speciﬁc and sophisticated psychological theories and
to come to grips with speciﬁc and often deep and long-standing
theoretical issues that are inescapably attached to psychological
achievements. Accordingly, the cognitive neurosciences offer par-
ticularly fortunate conditions for attempts to swiftly optimize the
criteria that are currently regarded as control variables for success
in the academicmarket. Corresponding individual efforts perforce
will yield a growing percentage of experimental studies that take
investigations of theoretically more or less superﬁcial independent
and dependent variables, within received paradigms, as an end in
itself. While the presently prevailing emphasis on rather simple
quantitative indices of “visibility” and short-term achievements
is itself the offspring of the predominating inductivist and data-
oriented (mis-)conception of science, it will in turn promote and
amplify the proliferation of a-theoretical attitudes in the empirical
sciences.
The a-theoretical attitude presently prevailing in the cognitive
neurosciences can accordingly be attributed to the effects of two
interlinked types of factors, both of which are alien to natural
science: psychological factors related to common-sense concep-
tions regarding the classiﬁcation of phenomena and notions of
explanation, on the one hand, and sociological factors related to
economically oriented control and evaluation variables, on the
other. Of course, not only cognitive neuroscience but psychology
as a whole has been affected by these developments, in the course
of which guiding ideals and methodological principles of what is
called modern science are at risk of sinking into oblivion.
These more cursory notes on some unwarranted tacit assump-
tions in cognitive neuroscience have been occasioned by the
observation of a discrepancy between the promises and the extra-
ordinary public and institutional success of the cognitive neu-
rosciences, on the one hand, and a less favorable assessment of
actual achievements in our theoretical understanding of mental
phenomena, on the other. The endeavor to gain a better theoret-
ical understanding, within the framework of the natural sciences,
of the principles underlying mental phenomena is undoubtedly
of paramount importance, not only for psychology but for the
program of the natural sciences in general. Consequently, it is of
some signiﬁcance to identify factors that presumably are adversary
to this endeavor.
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